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Introduction
For the past two decades the policy debate on issues related to the aging population has been growing at unprecedented rates throughout the world. On the one hand, policy measures suggested in the debate include removal of the disincentives for labor force participation for near elderly (CBO 2004 , U.S. DHHS 1997 , Apfel 2004 . This would eectively raise the wage rate faced by the targeted group, as in the case of the elimination of the Social Security earnings test for those older than 65 in the United States (Friedberg 2000) . On the other hand, the role of informal caregiving is emphasized as a means to \keep many individuals at home who would otherwise require expensive institutional care" (U.S. DHHS 1997, p.6) . Policies targeting these two objectives may turn out to conict with each other: higher wages may decrease hours devoted to informal care for elderly parents, while policies encouraging informal care may lead to fewer working hours. Research on the eects of the Social Security earnings test mostly focuses on labor supply and claiming behavior of the aected group (Haider and Loughran 2005; Baker and Benjamin 1999; Burtless and Mott 1984; Friedberg 2000; Gruber and Orszag 1999) with little attention paid to the potential interaction between incentives for paid employment and caregiving choices. This interaction may have adverse implications for the well-being of the oldest old, given that the prevalence of caregiving is highest among individuals in their late mid-life. 1 Central to the analysis of this interaction is the concept of the wage elasticity. The labor supply literature suggests a positive wage elasticity of labor supply (smaller for males, larger for females). Therefore, if the wage elasticity of informal care supply is close to zero (as has been found in earlier studies), higher wages would lead to more labor supplied with negligible eects on the provision of informal care. In this case one might hope that benets from increased labor supply will not be oset along other dimensions. If, on the contrary, the wage elasticity of informal care supply is relatively large and negative, one should be more cautious when evaluating the eects of scal policies on labor supply among individuals in their late mid-life. A substantial negative wage elasticity of informal care supply would mean that along with increasing labor supply near elderly would cut back on the hours of informal care they provide to their elderly parents. This may potentially lead to more people turning to the government in their quest for help with covering formal long-term care costs.
Previous studies that have examined the eect of wages on transfers to elderly parents have emphasized the substitution between time and monetary modes of informal care (Sloan et al. 2002; Zissimopoulos 2001; Ioannides and Kan 1999; Sloan et al. 1997; Couch et al. 1999) . The estimated eect of wages on informal care hours is negative (as theory predicts), but very small in magnitude and usually not signicant statistically. At the same time the estimated wage eect on gross money transfers to elderly parents is positive and quite signicant both statistically and economically. However, these studies have been limited in their ability to address the issue of possible bias in the estimates of the wage elasticities due to omitted variables concerns. For example, failure to properly control for productivity dierences or personality traits such as responsibility and respect to seniors may lead to an upward bias in the estimates of the wage elasticity of informal care supply: more productive/responsible people would be supplying more informal care and would also have higher wages in the labor market.
The goal of this paper is to study the wage elasticity of informal care supply, directly addressing the issues of omitted variables in the time allocation and monetary transfer equations. Informal care supply is dened as annual time spent helping elderly parents with basic personal needs as well as household chores, errands, and transportation. This paper uses a unique opportunity of access to the restricted geographic identiers for the Health and Retirement Study respondents to instrument hourly wages with the industry structure in the state of residence allowing for dierential impact by education. 2 The main nding of the paper suggests that the wage elasticity of informal care supply is negative and substantially larger in magnitude than previously estimated. Due to the weakness of the instruments there is still a signicant remaining bias in the estimates of the wage elasticity. However, since the direction of the bias is the same as in the OLS, the obtained estimates can be treated as lower bounds of the true elasticities. For example, according to the current estimates a 10 percent increase in wages translates into an 18 percent decrease in average informal care provided by males and 36 percent decrease in average informal care provided by females. Additional ndings include the following: (i) the wage elasticity of informal care supply is more negative for people who have at least one sibling and those who have no parent living with them and/or in a nursing home; (ii) the wage elasticity of help with personal needs is smaller in magnitude than the wage elasticity of time spent helping parents with chores, errands, transportation, etc.; (iii) estimates of the wage elasticity of net monetary transfers do not support the hypothesis that individuals replace time transfers to parents with monetary transfers as their wages go up.
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 presents some background information, followed by the econometric specication in Section 3. Data is described in Section 4. Section 5 presents the empirical ndings and a discussion of some extensions to the main analysis of informal care supply.
Background
Thus far, studies of informal care supply to elderly parents have been mostly descriptive even though this area is receiving growing attention in various social science disciplines. In economics a considerable body of research has been developed on the motivation behind intergenerational transfers (mainly nancial) and some on residential decisions, while sociologists, for instance, have focused on identifying the determinants of the incidence and intensity of informal care supply with paying little attention to economic variables (Schkokkaert 2006) . Several more recent works are devoted to the study of the relationship between formal and informal care. Van Houtven and Norton (2004) nd that informal care reduces home health care use and delay nursing home entry, while Viitanen (2007) shows that increase in higher government expenditures on formal care reduce the probability of informal caregiving outside the household. Other studies are also supportive of the fact that informal and formal care are substitutes (Bolin et al. 2007) .
A few papers that consider the eect of changes in care giver's wages on time transfers to elderly parents study the trade-o between time and money dimensions of help using data from the Health and Retirement Study, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, and the National Long-Term Care Survey of Informal Caregivers (Sloan et al. 2002; Zissimopoulos 2001; Ioannides and Kan 1999; Sloan et al. 1997; Couch et al. 1999 ). The results from these studies suggest that the eect of wages on informal care is not signicant, either economically or statistically, while the wage impact on gross monetary transfers from adult children to their parents is positive and signicant. The estimates of the wage elasticity of informal care supply range from -0.78 to 0.07 (Table 1) . However these estimates may be subject to an omitted variable bias. An upward bias from omitted variables may explain small magnitudes of the wage elasticities estimated earlier. For example, some people may be more productive in everything they do, which is dicult to control for with a conventional set of variables available to researchers. Therefore, these people would provide more care, but also would be rewarded in the market with higher wages. As a result, the estimated wage eect in such a case would be upward biased, i.e. less negative.
In contrast to the scarcity of research on the wage elasticity of informal care supply, there is a large literature that has been devoted to the study of the wage elasticity of labor supply. There exist several generations of research in this area and they are extensively reviewed by Pencavel (1986 Pencavel ( , 1998 Pencavel ( , 2002 , Killingsworth and Heckman (1986) , Mroz (1987) , and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) in an attempt to document the variation in the estimates found and determine the sources of these dierences. The overall conclusion from this literature is that the wage elasticity of labor supply is positive and is larger for females than for males, although converging over time (Schwabish 2002; Heim 2007 ).
Econometric Specication Estimation Strategy and Specication
The theoretical framework underlying the empirical analysis is based on the simple oneperiod model of time allocation that involves two individuals: the care recipient and the care giver (Sloan et al. 2002) . Care recipient refers to an elderly parent and care giver to his/her adult child. This model starts with the idea that the caregiver maximizes her own utility that depends on her own consumption goods, leisure, and utility of the care recipient which in turn depends on consumption goods and care. The maximization is subject to the production of care, the time constraint and the standard budget constraints, with a possibility of monetary transfers between the parties. Care can be purchased in the market or produced using the caregiver's time. According to this framework, the allocation decisions of the caregiver as to the time for work and caregiving, monetary transfer, as well as purchased care will depend on the vector of prices (caregiver's wage, price of formal care), non-labor income, and socio-economic characteristics of the caregiver and care recipient. Unfortunately, the data used in the empirical analysis do not provide any information on market-purchased help by care recipients or prices they face, thus reducing the system to three equations 3 : t £ gi = g log w i + X i g + u gi
(1)
where t gi is annual hours of informal care for elderly parents, t wi = annual working hours, D i = annual net money transfer to elderly parents, w i = individual's hourly wage rate, and X i is a vector of controls for individual i, discussed later.
The wage eect on informal care supply is estimated using the Tobit model, as in most of the studies on informal care supply, to incorporate corner solutions into the estimation. A linear-log specication is chosen for the labor supply and money transfer equations. 4 All three equations are estimated separately for men and women. Since the model has three equations with identical regressors, generalized least squares for the system of linear equations produces as ecient estimates as the ordinary least squares equation-by-equation (Greene 2000, 616) . However, a complication arises due to the fact that not all of the equations in the system are linear. Bhattacharya (2004) shows that in the case of the binary dependent variable, the joint estimation produces more ecient estimates. No study investigates the case of the limited dependent variable that follows the Tobit model. So it is assumed that in general the estimation equation-by-equation of the model with two linear and one Tobit equations would be less ecient, but still consistent, as is the case with the system of linear equations.
Econometric Issues with the Wage Eect Estimation
Some of the factors that enter Equations 1-3 are not available in the data. For example, information on some of the important determinants of the informal care supply, such as the price of formal care as well as unobserved personality traits related to productivity in caregiving and willingness to help others (responsibility, respect for seniors, etc.) is usually not available to researchers. Lack of this information is likely to lead to the problems associated with omitted variables. The estimates of the wage elasticity of informal care supply would not be biased if the assumption of zero correlation between wages and omitted variables were plausible, and the equation was linear. However, in the current setting this is not true. For example, the price of formal care is likely to be higher for people living in high-wage areas, and failure to control for this would result in an upward biased estimate of the wage eect on informal caregiving time. Similarly, the productivity in caregiving may be positively correlated with the productivity on the job leading to an upward bias in the wage eect estimate. This upward bias can explain the close to zero estimates of the wage eect on informal care supply in the earlier studies.
The omitted variable problem in the caregiving analysis is similar to that found in estimating standard labor supply elasticities. Over the last few decades a number of attempts have been undertaken to use dierent instrumental variables in the labor supply setting. Pen-cavel (1986) mentions sets of instruments used in the early literature which have since been disqualied (Mroz, 1987) . These include such variables as own education, experience, and the reported hourly wage rate used to instrument the wage rate calculated from earnings and hours. Somewhat controversial variables are education of parents and their socio-economic status, lagged values of the wage rate, urban residence indicator, and polynomials in age and education. Sets of aggregated information such as unemployment rates and industry structure in the region of residence, cohort average schooling, other group level variables, and polynomials in regional and time trends have been shown to be better instruments (Pencavel 2002; Senesky 2003; Bacolod 2007) , as they have no impact on the labor supply but through wages. However, sine these instruments are aggregate level variables, they are not very strong predictors of wages, raising the issue of weak instruments.
This study oers a novel set of both aggregate and individual level instruments for wages. This set is inspired by Borjas and Ramey (1995) , who nd dierential impact of international trade on workers by skill level. These instruments include state unemployment rate and state industry structure described by the percentages of the working population employed in each of the services, government, and three manufacturing sectors { trade-impacted concentrated industries, competitive industries, and other durables industries 5 and interactions of these aggregate variables with the education level of respondents. The assumption behind this choice of instruments is that they reect only the labor demand conditions and are not related to the choice of hours spent on various activities (labor, caregiving) directly or through omitted variables. Regional dummies are included to control for such factors as formal care opportunities and prices 6 , and further tests are performed to check for the validity of the chosen set of instruments.
Data and Descriptive Analysis
The main analysis in this paper is implemented using the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data from the 1998 wave. 7 The Health and Retirement Study is a national longitudinal survey of people born in 1947 and earlier providing a rich source of information on the lives of older Americans, including their health and economic status.
The analysis focuses on a cross-section of working individuals 8 who can potentially provide time to their parents or parents-in-law (both are referred to as \parents" throughout the paper). In the present study parents are treated as a group, similar to Ioannides and Kan (2000) . Year 1998 has been chosen as the year that allows the largest sample size of individuals with living parents possible among all the HRS waves.
Focusing on only working individuals may raise the issue of selectivity bias. However, in the labor supply context Mroz (1987) shows that even for the sample of married women, the population for which the selectivity issue has always been considered important, selection does not have a signicant impact on the estimates of the wage elasticity of labor supply as long as labor market experience is not treated as an exogenous determinant of wages (i.e., as an instrument). In the context of transfers, especially informal care, the selectivity issue may be dierent if caregiving responsibilities draw people out of the labor force or into retirement. The rst concern seem unlikely given the focus of the study on the population of near elderly, who themselves are approaching old age with the need to contribute to their own retirement funds and plan for their own care expenses. However, the literature is silent on this issue. The second concern seems much more likely, but the literature does not provide conclusive evidence on the impact of informal care responsibilities on retirement decisions. Some studies in sociology and gerontology do show that caregiving women are more likely to quit employment than non-caregiving (Dentinger and Clarkberg 2002; Pavalko and Henderson 2006) , while others suggest no eect (Pienta 2003; Johnson and Favreault 2001; Coile 2004) . The only direct test of the impact of caregiving responsibilities for elderly parents is done by Kazi (2006) who shows that the potential parent care needs do not accelerate exit into retirement.
Dependent Variables
The dependent variables used in the main analysis are annual working hours, annual hours spent helping parents with basic needs and household chores, and net annual monetary transfer to parents (gross transfer to parents minus gross transfer from parents). Annual 7 The HRS is sponsored by the National Institute of Aging (grant number NIA U01AG 009740) and is conducted by the University of Michigan. 8 Workers include those who report positive working hours and do not report full retirement in 1998. 9 working time is the product of usual weekly hours of work and number of weeks worked across all jobs. The questions concerning intergenerational transfers are asked as follows: Now about help to and from parents...
1.
Not counting any shared housing or shared food, did you give nancial help to your parents or parents-in-law amounting to $500 or more [since last interview, in the last two years]?
How about another kind of help: If the answer is \yes" to these questions, then the respondent is asked the amount of the transfer provided. Overall, the eective annual time spent helping parents is dened here as the sum of the time spent helping parents with basic personal needs and time spent helping parents with household chores. Although the question is asked so that the dependent variable should be left-censored at 50 hours a year, in practice, time use smaller than that is reported as well. 9 Thus, in the current analysis the lower limit on time use is set to zero.
Explanatory Variables
The variable of interest -hourly wage rate -is taken directly if reported on an hourly basis. Otherwise, it is constructed by dividing earnings from the main job over a certain time period (year, month, two weeks, week) by the total reported working hours in the main job over that period. 10 The set of individual controls in all specications include the following: age, age squared, education, education squared, current non-wage income dened as capital income, household wealth, marital status, non-white, Hispanics, region dummies (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999) , number of young children (0-6 years old), number of 6-18 year-old children (Mroz, 1987) , and number of siblings by gender, own and in-laws. The last variables aim to control for other 9 A considerable number of individuals reported time in caregiving smaller than 50 hours (112 out of 387 cases with positive care hours among males and 68 out of 495 cases among females). 10 50% of males and 56% of females report being paid hourly.
possible time demands and availability of substitutes. Mulligan (1995) suggests the inclusion of health measures since disutility from work may increase as people age. Therefore, health measures may become signicant determinants of labor supply, as well as of informal care supply, for older workers.
In addition to the individual characteristics, all of the specications in the main analysis include characteristics of parents. These characteristics refer to the set of all living parents and include the number of surviving parents (maximum four), the ratio of the number of mothers to the number of living parents, the age of the oldest parent, the indicators if at least one of the parents (i) is single, (ii) has memory related disease, (iii) is a homeowner, and (iv) is identied by the respondent as being nancially worse o or better o than the respondent. The indicator of whether there is at least one parent with the memory related disease is used as a proxy for the need of care, which seems to be dicult to misreport. The other related questions in the HRS ask whether the parent needs care, or whether the parent can be left alone for at least one hour. It seems that these questions are more subjective that the one chosen for the analysis: if a respondent is providing a signicant number of hours of care, (s)he is much more likely to report that the parent needs care and/or cannot be left alone for at least one hour. Similarly, the one who does not want to provide care seem to be more likely to respond that the parent does not need care and can be left alone for a long period of time.
Sample Description
The sample is limited to working, not self-employed, age-eligible individuals who have at least one parent or parent-in-law alive in 1998. Individuals retired in 1998 are excluded from the study. The resulting sample consists of 1434 males and 1356 females who have complete data on all of the variables of interest. See Appendix Table A1 for the sample construction details. Table 2 presents a description of the sample. All nancial variables are in 2002 dollars and non-labor income is in thousands of dollars. As can be seen from Panel A, the mean annual working hours for male workers is on average 400 hours higher than for females (2290 hours vs. 1897 hours). Unconditional (on caregiving status) caregiving hours average at 44 hours per year for males and 91 hours per year for females (2% and 5% of the average annual working time respectively). The dierence widens to about 100 hours between males and females when conditioning on actual caregiving status (163 vs. 250 hours). Consideration by the type of caregiving suggests that the dierence between men and women involved in caregiving is greater in time devoted to help with personal needs than in time devoted to help with chores, transportation, errands, etc. 11 Net money transfer is negative indicating that money ows into the care givers' households from their parents. Descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables is presented in Panel B of the same Table. 5 Empirical Results and Discussion Wage Elasticity Estimates Table 3 shows the estimates of the wage impact on labor supply, informal care, and monetary transfers from both OLS/Tobit and instrumental variable regressions. 12 As could be seen the eect of wages on the informal care supply is negative and it is increasing in magnitude after instrumenting. The magnitude of the wage eect on informal care supply is smaller for men than it is for women, and it is not statistically signicant for men. The wage eect on labor supply is positive in every case both for males and females and increases in magnitude considerably after instrumenting. The analysis of the net monetary transfers between adult children and elderly parents does not provide evidence for the substitution between time and monetary transfers as wages get higher. One of the potential explanations may be the possibility that the measure of the net monetary transfer over a certain short period of time does not allow for that substitution eect to take place. For example, what if the decrease in the informal care provided today is balanced with the decrease in the end-of-life transfer from parents? Indeed, Brown (2006) nds that parents on average bequeathe more to children who are currently providing informal care or who are expected to become care givers in the future.
The last panel of Table 3 provides rst-stage statistics common to all regressions while the p-values from the Hansen overidentication tests are reported for each outcome measure separately. As could be seen, the latter test produces very high p-values, conrming the validity of the used instruments. Likewise, the hypothesis of underidentication is rejected at less than 1 percent level of signicance. However, the comparison of the rst stage F-statistics with the critical values reported in Stock and Yogo (2004) points to the problem of weak instruments even if 30 percent relative bias in the same direction as the OLS bias is accepted. Stock and Yogo (2004) do not report critical values for higher than 30 percent relative bias, but it could be extrapolated from Table 1 in their work (p.39) that for the 50 percent relative bias the rst stage F-statistics would be sucient to pass the weak instruments test. This means that the set of the instruments used in the analysis is quite weak resolving only 50 percent of the omitted variable bias in the OLS estimates. Alternatively, this means that the value of the estimate of the wage elasticity of informal care supply is far from the true one, and can only be treated as a lower bound of a more negative elasticity.
The estimates of the wage elasticities evaluated at the sample means are provided in Table 4 . The estimates from the OLS and Tobit regressions show negative but close to zero wage elasticities of informal care supply. Compared to them, IV procedure produces much larger estimates: -1.8 for males and -3.6 for females. The wage elasticity of labor supply is also considerably larger in magnitude after instrumenting.
It is instructive to think about the magnitudes of the estimated elasticities: a 10% increase in wages (2.1 for men and 1.5 for women in 2002 dollars) would lead to an average decrease by 18% for men and 36% for women in unconditional hours of care provided. That would translate into 8 fewer hours of care provided by men and 33 fewer hours of care provided by women per year. The same increase in wages, with the labor supply elasticity of 0.19 (men) and 0.31 (women), implies 44 hours more work per annum for men and 59 for women. This comparison suggests that the wage elasticity of care supply is far from being trivial. On the contrary, in absolute terms it makes up about 18% of the labor supply response for men and about 56% of the labor supply response for women. However, the evaluation of the combined eect of scal incentives and encouragement for informal care requires further investigation
Since the focus of this study is on the informal care that adult children provide to their elderly parents, the rest of this section will consider some important extensions in turns: impact of the availability of substitutes and parents' living arrangements.
Availability of Substitutes
While the analysis above focuses on the total time devoted to parents, the detailed information in the data also allows studying the wage eects on the care supply disaggregated by the type of activities. It is reasonable to expect the help with household chores to be more elastic: it may be less burdensome and not as urgent as personal care; hence, it is easier to postpone the task or to nd a substitute. For example, the frequency of household chores or money management can be easier to reduce in the face of increasing wage rates compared to the tasks of bathing, dressing, and feeding the elderly parents. Indeed, even though for males there is very little dierence between the time for personal needs and that for chores, for women it is clear that the time spent helping parents with household chores has a more pronounced negative relationship with wages.
Rows (2)-(3) in Table 5 provide information for the comparison of the wage elasticities of informal care supply by dierent types of caregiving activities not conditioning on the actual caregiving status. As can be seen, the estimated wage elasticity of help with household chores is generally larger than that of the help with basic personal needs, and the dierence is greater for females.
Row (4) in Table 5 shows that individuals with siblings (the majority of the sample) are more responsive to changes in the wage rates, with the estimates of the wage elasticities being considerably larger than in the benchmark case in row (1).
To summarize, these ndings suggest that the wage elasticity of informal care supply depends on the availability and easiness of substitution. The easier it is to nd a substitute for a certain caregiving task (either because the task itself is not unpleasant, or because a care giver has more siblings to rely on) the higher the wage elasticity is.
Parents' Living Arrangements
Current analysis does not account for the dierences in living arrangements of elderly parents. It includes parents living independently, with the respondent or other relatives, or in nursing home. At the same time this potentially may have considerable impact on the results. On the one hand, the amount of care provided may depend on how far the parent lives from the child, suggesting living arrangement as another control in the model. On the other hand, parents' living arrangements can be considered as part of the informal care supply decisions: when the need for more care arises, parents may relocate closer to the child, or start coresiding together. Earlier literature tried to circumvent this problem by excluding pairs with coresident parents and parents in nursing homes. Table 5 shows the results for the samples of individuals excluding individuals with at least one parent (i) coresiding with them, (ii) in nursing home, (iii) either coresiding or in nursing home. Although, the estimated elasticities change slightly, and in some cases the estimated eects become statistically insignicant, they are still quite close to the ones obtained from the basic analysis. Thus, the estimates obtained earlier are fairly robust to the dierences in the living arrangements of elderly parents.
Conclusion
This paper extends the existing literature on informal caregiving by addressing the issue of omitted variable bias in the estimates of the wage elasticity of informal care supply. Existence of this bias would suggest that the previous estimates may be too small. Using the state level unemployment rate and industry structure and their interactions with education as instruments for wages, this study nds that the elasticity of informal care supply with respect to wages is negative and large in magnitude. Although the problem of weak instruments suggests a signicant remaining bias, the estimates of the wage elasticity of informal care supply can be treated as lower bounds, drawing attention to the presence of considerable in magnitude negative impact of wages on informal care for elderly.
As in the case of labor supply, the supply of informal care by females tends to be more elastic than that by males. Furthermore, informal care supply is more elastic for individuals who have siblings and independently living parents, and is more elastic when considering time spent helping parents with household chores, errands, transportation, etc., suggesting that the availability of the substitutes and the ease of substitution matters a lot for the magnitude of the informal care supply response to wages. However, the analysis does not support the hypothesis of substitution from time towards monetary transfers to elderly parents as wages get higher.
To conclude, this paper shows that the scal incentives which would eectively increase wages of near elderly could bring more hours of labor supplied. However, this increase will be accompanied by a decrease in the number of hours of informal care provided to the elderly. The question remains of whether the benets from increased labor supply would outweigh the costs associated with lower levels of informal care. And the answer depends on many other estimates -average tax rates, prices of formal care, likelihood that the elderly would seek government support to cover the formal care costs, and the consequences to those who would decide not to seek any care -which denitely requires further research. Notes:
1. Standard errors in parenthesis.
2. ** -signicant at 1% level, * -signicant at 5%, + -signicant at 10%.
3. Every estimate is from the regression with the full set of individual and parental controls described in the methodology. 
Price of Formal Care
Formal care in the theoretical model described in the paper refers to the time or services of other people that can be purchased from outside the parent-child dyad. Although no information on the formal care prices is available from the data, state level proxy variable can be used to get an idea of its importance. One of the possible candidates would be the mean wage of the personal home care aides. 13 The duties of workers in this occupation very closely correspond to the list of activities mentioned in the HRS questions from which the informal care variable is constructed. Table A5 reports selected coecients from the regressions similar to those in the main analysis without and with instrumenting. As could be seen inclusion of the proxy for the price of personal home care in the form of the mean wage of personal home care aides in the state of residence does not have much impact on the estimated wage eect for males and leads to a decrease in the magnitude of the estimate for females. In addition, the estimated coecient for the proxy is quite small with very large standard errors.
This analysis, however, has some drawbacks that may explain these results. First, the state average is assigned to the respondent based on his/her own state of residence, since the information on the parents' state of residence is not available. Also, the state average wage maybe a poor proxy for the price of paid home care that the individuals face. There exists a vast array of possibilities to choose from. Some people may turn to companies specializing in elderly care, others may hire a nurse or a maid to assist them in everyday life, or pay certain amount of money to their relatives to provide occasional services. Yet another possibility available for poor elderly would be to have Medicare paid personal home care services which are prescribed by the doctor. This implies existence of a wide range of formal care prices within the same state.
To circumvent the problem related to the state of residence of the parents and test whether the state average wage of personal care workers is a good proxy for the price that individuals face an analysis of its own eect on the demand for paid home care has been implemented using HRS reposndents as paid care recipients. The right hand side variable in this analysis is the number of hours of paid personal home care per month that an HRS respondent gets. A set of controls is chosen so as to get more similarity with the main analysis in the current paper, accounting for the fact that the respondents are now care recipients, not care givers. Results in Table A6 show that in spite of the fact that the own price eect is negative (as would be expected), the estimated standard errors are quite large making the estimates not signicant statistically. This test clearly indicates that even if the information on the parental state of residence was available, the state average wage would be a poor proxy for the price of formal care. 
